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Problemstellung und Empfehlungen
Deutsch-französischer Neuanfang in der militärischen Zusammenarbeit
Wie kann  rechtzeitig zum 40. Jahrestag des Elysée-Vertrages  die Vitali-
tät des deutsch-französischen Verhältnisses befördert und zugleich der
Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) ein neuer
Schub gegeben werden?
Der multilaterale EU-Rahmen mit der wachsenden Zahl von Mehrheits-
entscheidungen im Rat prämiert verläßliche Koalitionen. Keine verspricht
mehr Gewicht als die zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich. Beide Länder
stehen mit ihren Vorstellungen jeweils für eine größere Gruppe von Mit-
gliedstaaten. Eine zwischen Paris und Berlin getroffene Übereinkunft hat
deshalb gute Aussicht auf Unterstützung durch die Mehrheit. Die zuneh-
mende europäische Verßechtung macht eine enge deutsch-französische
Zusammenarbeit nicht weniger wichtig, sie erhöht vielmehr die Effektivi-
tät beider Länder in der EU.
Dies gilt auch im Bereich militärischer Zusammenarbeit. Hier verhinder-
ten lange unterschiedliche Einstellungen zur Atlantischen Allianz und in-
kompatible Streitkräfte-Strukturen eine verstärkte Gemeinsamkeit; der
entscheidende Anstoß zur Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungs-
politik (ESDP) kam nicht zufällig durch eine britisch-französische Initia-
tive. Inzwischen jedoch ist der europäische Elan in Verteidigungsfragen
erlahmt. Ein neuer Anstoß ist notwendig. Er wird heute am überzeugend-
sten erfolgen, wenn Deutschland und Frankreich in ihrer militärischen Zu-
sammenarbeit vorangehen und damit ein Beispiel auch für andere EU-Part-
ner setzen.
Das neue strategische Umfeld begünstigt diese Zusammenarbeit ebenso
wie die wachsende Annäherung der militärischen Strukturen beider
Länder. Die neuen Gefährdungen durch Terrorismus und Massenvernich-
tungswaffen unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit engeren Zusammen-
wirkens auf bilateraler wie auf europäischer Ebene. Die veränderte strate-
gische Ausrichtung der Vereinigten Staaten macht europäisches Zusam-
menwirken in der Sicherheitspolitik zugleich nötiger und möglicher.
Nötiger, weil die Staaten der EU amerikanische Entscheidungen allenfalls
durch gemeinsames Vorgehen werden beeinßussen können. Da in der
amerikanischen Global-Strategie der Nato eine weniger zentrale Rolle zu-
gewiesen wird, werden auch die Schwierigkeiten verringert, die der unter-
schiedliche Allianz-Status Frankreichs und Deutschlands für gemeinsames
Vorgehen bedeutete. Schließlich unterstreicht die holperige Entwicklung
von ESVP, daß auch hier wie in anderen EU-Bereichen ein stetiges, enges
Zusammengehen von Frankreich und Deutschland wesentliche Erfolgs-
bedingung bleibt. Und möglicher wird dieses Zusammengehen, weil beide
Länder sich in der Orientierung ihrer Streitkräfte-Strukturen inzwischen
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weitgehend angenähert haben  weg von traditioneller Landesverteidi-
gung, hin zu Krisen-Prävention und -Intervention.
Vor diesem Hintergrund werden folgende konkrete Maßnahmen
deutsch-französischer Zusammenarbeit empfohlen:
! In der strategischen Aufklärung setzen beide Länder auf unterschied-
liche Programme  Frankreich auf Helios II, Deutschland auf SAR-Lupe.
Beide sollen so gestaltet werden, daß sie sich ergänzen und den Kern
eines europäischen satellitengestützten Aufklärungsverbundes bilden.
Eine gemeinsame Einrichtung zur Auswertung der von beiden Systemen
übermittelten Informationen würde diese Komplementarität entschei-
dend fördern.
! Jeder größere europäische Militäreinsatz erfordert ein gemeinsames,
mobiles Hauptquartier mit gesicherten Kommunikationsverbindungen.
Frankreich und Deutschland sollten ein solches Hauptquartier gemein-
sam errichten und für die EU bereitstellen.
! Die Fähigkeiten beider Länder zu strategischem Truppentransport  in
der Luft wie zu Wasser  und gegebenenfalls zur Luftbetankung sollten
in einer gemeinsamen Organisation koordiniert werden.
! Wenn europäische Truppen gemeinsam eingesetzt werden sollen,
müssen die militärischen Führer miteinander und mit gemeinsamen
Einsatzregeln vertraut sein. Deswegen sollten Frankreich und Deutsch-
land gemeinsame Ausbildungsgänge, zumindest aber in ihren natio-
nalen Ausbildungsstätten multilaterale Kurse vorsehen.
! In gemeinsamen Einsatzregionen ist die Logistik weiterhin rein national
organisiert, ein kostspieliger Luxus. Frankreich und Deutschland sollten
ihre Depots dem anderen Partner jeweils zur Benutzung öffnen und in
Einsatzgebieten mit langer gemeinsamer Verweildauer ihre nationale
Logistik verschmelzen.
! Spezial-Truppen wird eine wachsende Bedeutung in künftigen militäri-
schen Einsätzen zukommen. Zusammen verfügen Deutschland und
Frankreich über mehrere Tausend derartige Soldaten. Sie sollten regel-
mäßig gemeinsam üben und mit kompatiblen Kommunikations- und
Transportmitteln ausgestattet werden.
! Für die entsprechenden Rüstungsprogramme sollten gemeinsame
Budgets für klar deÞnierte Projekte von den Parlamenten beider Länder
bewilligt und von einem gemeinsamen Ausschuß aus Assemblée Natio-
nale und dem Deutschen Bundestag überwacht werden. Damit könnten
die mit dem bisherigen Verfahren bei gemeinsamen Rüstungsprojekten
verbundenen Verzögerungen und Verstimmungen erheblich reduziert
und der Anreiz zu europäischer Rüstungszusammenarbeit wesentlich
erhöht werden.
! Ein ständiges deutsch-französisches Sekretariat, mit kleiner, gemischter
Besetzung und alternierend in Paris und Berlin tagend, würde erheblich
dazu beitragen, jede der beiden Regierungen über Vorhaben der ande-
ren auf dem laufenden zu halten, Irritationen über mangelnde Informa-
tionsbereitschaft zu verringern und die Suche nach gemeinsamen
Lösungen zu ermuntern.
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Introduction
This paper is the collaborative effort of a small group of Germans and
Frenchmen concerned about the fact that Franco-German co-operation,
once the centerpiece of European integration, seems to have fallen into
disrepair. This concern is not the product of nostalgia for the past when
France and Germany both attached major importance to close and fruitful
ties, nor is this study dictated by the desire to Þnd something, come what
may, to revive that state of affairs. Rather it follows from our conviction
that in many areas, Franco-German policy co-ordination is in the national
interest of both countries as a result of the changed international
environment in which they Þnd themselves both individually and as part
of the European Union.
Hence the focus of the analysis and recommendations that follows is on
the Unions defence policy and the contribution both states can make
towards it by working close together. There will be no EU foreign and
defence policy unless France and Germany take an active part in shaping
it. And their ability to do so depends largely on their willingness to do so
together. In many, if not most instances, the examples they set in their
bilateral co-operation can serve to promote wider co-operation within the
Union and thus serve Europes international inßuence. But even if others
do no follow the examples, effective co-operation in these Þelds will
increase the inßuence of both. Their national interest will be advanced in
either case.
It is, of course, never easy to breathe new life into a fading relationship.
Both France and Germany have lost much of their initial inclination to
give priority to working together and are using repeated disappointments
to justify this trend. Each has signalled that there might be other, more
accommodating partners or professed a preference for shifting coalitions
within the decision-making bodies of the European Union. But these
attitudes reßect political fashion rather than a careful analysis of national
interests; above all, they indicate how the deep differences between France
and Germany on the Common Agricultural Policy have affected the overall
bilateral relationship.
Yet the fact remains that in the emerging European Union of soon 25
members, a privileged relationship to another major power offers the best
chance for gaining majorities. And while for both France and Germany
other major members of the Union may at times and in speciÞc cases seem
the more obvious partner, there is for neither an alternative to the other
across the board. At the very least, shifting coalitions will always be more
difÞcult to form and sustain for either without the basis of a privileged
partnership between France and Germany. Recognition of that basic fact
should make the inevitable strains of a sustained partnership more
bearable.
Christoph Bertram is
Director, Joachim Schild
Senior Researcher at SWP,
François Heisbourg Director
and Yves Boyer Deputy
Director of FRS
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This also applies to the Þeld of defence policy. At Þrst glance, this may
seem surprising. After all, Germany has traditionally been more Atlanticist
than Gaullist-minded France, fully integrated into Natos military
organisation and frequently complaining about the strains of balancing its
defence ties between France and the US. On most issues of foreign policy,
France has rarely been reluctant to display a strong sense of independence
while Germany has preferred to stay in line with the United States. Yet, as
we will argue in this paper, those differences were relevant in the past but
are no longer so today. This is the result both of the process of European
integration which gives a premium to joint action, as well as that of the
changed strategic environment to which both countries need to adjust. To
pretend otherwise, however tempting for foreign policy and defence estab-
lishments loath to adjust, is to cling to outdated habits.
This paper will discuss the need to change and the opportunities that
close Franco-German co-operation in foreign and defence matters offers to
both and to Europe in three parts. The Þrst will analyse the main trends of
the strategic environment. The second chapter will look at the record of
Franco-German co-operation, and will describe the present state of affairs.
The Þnal chapter will discuss the institutional and political requirements
for a closer relationship and suggest speciÞc areas in which this could be
particularly rewarding.
As the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty approaches, France and
Germany have ample reason to try a new start; they may discover that few
areas can be as fruitful for their co-operation as that of defence. At any
rate, we hope that our analysis and proposals will be received in both
countries with an open mind and our suggestions with a willingness at
least to give them a try.
Christoph Bertram François Heisbourg
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Proposals for a New Beginning
Understanding the new strategic environment
! The intensity of risks and threats calls for new organisational and
budget initiatives at both nation-state and European Union levels.
! Current security challenges erode the traditional distinction between
the external and internal aspects of security and defence policy. This
must in turn lead to a much higher degree of institutional and organi-
sational congruence between the domestic and external dimension of
security and defence policy.
! Nato is not conÞgured to bear the bulk in coping with these challenges.
However, Nato should continue to play an important role as a provider
of interoperability to European defence forces. Given the changing role
of Nato, the difference of status of France and Germany vis-à-vis Nato
has become less of an obstacle than hitherto in generating European
defence policies and strategies.
! The US-European partnership, enshrined in the Washington treaty,
subsists. However, its practical content will increasingly be determined
by extraneous factors such as the evolution of US-Chinese relations and
US initiatives in South West Asia, notably in Iraq and the Gulf. Possible
conßicts of view on such issues, along with the divergent vision
between a multilateralist EU and a largely unilateralist US will
increase uncertainty as to the future of US-European strategic linkage.
! There exists a speciÞc and strong natural complementarity between
France and Germany. Recent experience has demonstrated that ESDP, as
other EU endeavours, cannot sustain momentum in the absence of a
long-lasting Franco-German agreement on the direction of EU inte-
gration. Alliances of opportunity or convenience of the sort prevailing
between Britain and France on European defence issues between 1998
and 2001 can be useful: but they are no substitute for a broader-based,
stable, long-lasting relationship between France and Germany.
Taking action
! Strategic Reconnaissance: The EUs envisaged Rapid Reaction Force will
require strategic reconnaissance. With Helios and SAR-Lupe, France and
Germany are engaging in building surveillance systems they need to
render complementary. One major step towards this will be the pooling
of the related military intelligence in a joint organisation.
! A mobile joint theatre command. In addition to home-based oper-
ational commands, any serious EU operation will require a joint force
headquarter to be dispatched to the theatre, equipped with secure com-
munications. France and Germany should set up and hold available
such a headquarter.
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! Pooling of air and maritime transport capabilities. A European stra-
tegic mobility command has long been proposed1 but, due to the
reticence of some EU members, still not been realised. France and
Germany should establish its air transport component bilaterally with-
out delay. They should also examine a similar arrangement for mari-
time transport. A fully ßedged strategic mobility command would also
include the pooling of in-ßight refuelling assets.
! Joint courses at national training establishments. Training facilities
are expensive duplications. It is true that the tendency of major
European armed forces to prefer nationally produced weapon systems
complicates interoperability and joint training also between France and
Germany. But this is not sufÞciently problematic to stand in the way of
establishing joint courses at national training establishments. At a
minimum, a multilateral course segment in national training facilities
would be of high value for joint planning and joint operations.
! Pooling logistics in joint theatres. Logistics organised on a purely
national basis are both expensive and, in operation, inefÞcient. For
neighbouring countries which are likely to be engaged together in most
military operations this is a doubtful luxury. A start could be made by
making basic arsenals available to the other partner and by pooling
logistic in the Balkan theatre in which both countries will remain
involved for a long time.
! Co-ordinating Special Forces. Special forces are likely to play an
increasing role in future military operations. France and Germany
together dispose of several thousand military personnel in these forces.
The very nature of their operations deÞes the establishment of joint
units. But much would be gained by training special forces jointly at
regular intervals and equipping them with compatible communications
and specialised transport. If successful, such programmes would en-
courage related efforts for the traditional forces as well. They would also
be a boost for joint arms planning production in these Þelds.
! A joint budget for joint arms programmes. Joint project budgets
relevant to the above proposals, voted by the two parliaments and
supervised by a joint parliamentary committee, would reduce many of
the frustrations currently accompanying common procurement efforts.
It would strengthen the authority of the joint organisations created for
this purpose as well as increase the incentive of European arms pro-
ducers to work together. Such project budgets could also serve as a
model for possible joint EU funding at a later stage.
! A joint monitoring body. France and Germany together should set up a
low-key, permanent Monitoring Secretariat, staffed by a small number
of civil servants from both countries and alternating its location
between Paris and Berlin. Such a modest body could help assure the
reliable ßow of information between the two governments independent
of their composition, avoid the misgivings of surprise and encourage the
search for common solutions.
1  See footnote 20 infra.
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The New Security Landscape
The security landscape France and Germany are facing is undergoing basic
change which is putting a close not only to the legacy of the Cold War, but
also to the transition period of the 1990s. The scope and the depth of the
transformation are due to the fact that key elements of the landscape are
shifting simultaneously:
! the threat situation is characterised by the ability of non-state actors to
wreak mass destruction. What was a risk prior to 9/11 is now a clear
and present danger which challenges the traditional categories of
internal security and military defence;
! the nature and the contents of the relationship between the United
States and its European allies is undergoing a deep revision, which puts
into question the transatlantic institutions along with the political and
strategic rationale which has underpinned them during more than Þfty
years;
! the European Union itself is undergoing a process of wrenching insti-
tutional and political change, with fundamental consequences, the con-
tent of which is contingent on the progress, or the abortion, of enlarge-
ment on the one hand, constitutional integration or non-integration on
the other.
These categories of change naturally interact with each other, and they
are also heavily inßuenced by other factors, external (e.g. Russia, China,
the Middle East ...) or internal (e.g. EU demographics). It will be argued
here that, in combination, the ongoing transformation generates a set of
challenges which make top-level French-German decision-shaping more
necessary; but they also introduce new difÞculties in the attempt to
reshape French-German co-operation in a manner which makes it both
relevant and effective.
New threats and risks
The Founding Fathers of modern Europe  Robert Schuman, Alcide de
Gasperi, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak   were
deliberately seeking to extinguish the risk of war between the European
states when they were preparing their various initiatives at the end of the
1940s. Progress along this roadmap has been uneven, particularly in
terms of security institutions. Although the Founding Fathers inspired in
June 1952 the treaty establishing a European Defence Community (EDC),
this initiative failed, with the French rejection of its ratiÞcation and the
British refusal to sign. Half a century later, the essentially inter-govern-
mental European security and defence policy (ESDP) is far removed from
the highly integrationist EDC.
However, success was complete in terms of discarding the threat of the
use of force as a mode of conduct between member states of the European
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institutions.2 Moreover, at the beginning of the twenty-Þrst century,
Europe is in a remarkably paciÞed situation: the Balkans and Cyprus
remain in a state of uncertainty, but war of the 90s variety appears to be
in the past rather than in the future; and Russia itself has become a
partner, albeit an occasionally difÞcult one, rather than a source of inter-
state insecurity, let alone war, in Europe proper.
Such a description hardly Þts the evolution of other parts of the security
landscape.
If one conÞnes oneself to conßict between states, three major sources of
insecurity represent an ever clearer and more present danger:
! the exacerbation of contradictions in the traditional Maghreb-to-
Pakistan ark of crisis;
! the spread of nuclear weapons, with the risk of the breakdown of the
existing non-proliferation regime, with a similar evolution in the
biological arena;
! the possible use of nuclear weapons in Asia, along with its consequences
for Europe.
Alongside the traditional Maghreb-to-Pakistan ark of crisis we have an
emerging nuclear ark of crisis extending from Israel to North East Asia:
two of the Þve ofÞcial nuclear powers (Russia and China), the three de facto
nuclear powers, the two nuclear wannabes (Iraq and North Korea, who
both violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] in their quest for
nuclear power), a suspected candidate for nuclear power (Iran) are all
located in Asia. Countries which have renounced the nuclear option,
willingly (Japan) or under outside pressure (South Korea, Taiwan) could
feel compelled to revisit the issue. And if the international NPT regime
breaks down in Asia, it will break down elsewhere as well. The current
renunciation of nuclear weapons by powers capable of acquiring them
would then cease to be the norm, with serious consequences for Europe,
most of whose countries have foregone the nuclear military option.3
In parallel, research and production of biological weapons (BW),
although renounced by 1444 members of the international community
under the 1972 BW treaty, is unfettered by any veriÞcation regime. As is
now known, the treaty was massively and deliberately violated by the USSR
from the day it was signed.5 Iraq has also done so from the late 80s on-
wards. And others, who have not been found out, cannot be assumed to
have been anymore respectful of the BW ban.
2  However, success has been less evident in terms of relations between member states
and non-member states of the EC/EU, including between Nato allies (see Greek-Turkish
relations); nor has use of military force been entirely excluded by member states when
dealing with non-state actors from neighbouring European states (e.g. French naval con-
frontations with fishing boats from Spain).
3  The nuclear option was most seriously considered by Sweden (which had the full
nuclear military fuel cycle in place by the end of the 1960s) and to a lesser extent Switzer-
land (in the mid-1950s) and West Germany (in 195758, in co-operation with France and
Italy).
4  Notable exceptions include Egypt, Israel, Kasakhstan, Sudan, and Syria.
5  See Biohazard by Ken Alibek (Alibekov) with Stephen Handelman, New York, 1998.
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The combination of enhanced WMD proliferation and of the aggra-
vation of tensions in the Greater Middle East represents a particular
challenge to Europe. The enlargement of the European Union will increase
the salience of these developments for the security of all the EUs mem-
bers. Since the entry of the Iberian countries and Greece, the EU Þnds itself
in close geographical proximity to the ark of crisis. The entry of Malta and
Cyprus will bring the EU even closer to the unstable Middle East.
The enlargement to central and eastern Europe will also bring the EU in
closer contact with areas and actors which risk infecting the Union with
their social and political problems: Kaliningrad, Moldova, Transnistria,
Montenegro are places which will require increasing attention from an
enlarged EU which has every reason to counter the emergence of zones of
lawlessness serving as safe havens for the logistical, Þnancial, and oper-
ational activity of trans-national criminal and terror groups.
Hyper-terrorism
On 11 September 2001, non-state actors have demonstrated the will and
the capability to wreak mass destruction. The hyper-terrorist threat intro-
duces a wholly new dimension in the strategic situation. Dealing with
these topics will require signiÞcant departures from existing defence
policies. The strategic cultures of France and Germany are being equally
challenged in this respect.
Among the consequences which ßow from the emergence of the threat
of mass destruction by non-state actors, the divide between the external
and internal dimensions of state security has been transformed. Non-state
antagonist work from within the targeted society while also operating
across borders. This carries with it three basic and closely international
implications:
! although the tools of military force projection will continue to be
materially distinct from those of internal police action, the basic facets
of counter terrorism (prevention, pre-emption, repression, damage limi-
tation) will not only have to be considered in an integrated manner but
domestic security and external defence machinery will have to be
tightly co-ordinated. In the French case, this is beginning to happen
with the establishment, at the Presidential level, of a Conseil de Sécurité
Intérieure alongside the Conseil de Défense;
! cross-border terrorism can only be met through cross-border counter
action, including measures in which state sovereignty is transferred to a
federal body (e.g. an EU border guard) or otherwise transformed (e.g. the
EU arrest warrant);
! cross-border non-state violence cannot be effectively countered without
the co-operation of other cross-border non-state actors, such as the
banking community or transportation companies.
Taken together, these will imply a transformation of pre 9/11 national
and European approaches to security and defence.
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Changing partnerships
Nato and the US
Along with the threat situation, the nature and content of the EU
members strategic partnerships is also undergoing a transformation, Þrst
and foremost the one with the United States of America, Europes security
guarantor for more than half a century.
On the aftermath of 9/11, US policy was ofÞcially encapsulated by
Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitzs stark formula its the mission that
makes the coalition. The Bush administrations propensity to avoid legally
binding foreign commitments  and standing military alliances are most
clearly in that category  had not hitherto extended openly to Nato. The
military organisation of the West will now no longer conduct operations
unless there is literally no alternative (as was indeed the case in Kosovo).
The question therefore arises as to the future role of Nato; and along with
it the companion, but not identical, question on the future of US-European
strategic solidarity.
First, there is a trend of Nato evolving into an OSCE with weapons, a
multilateral regional organisation projecting stability in Europe. This is
not a new development, since its beginnings during the Bosnian war of
Yugoslavia succession, from 1992 onwards. But the post-9/11 shift to
mission driven coalitions and the demilitarisation of Nato has in a sense
accelerated, and facilitated the political metamorphosis of the organi-
sation, which now fulÞls three basic stability-projection tasks:
1. peace-keeping and peace support in the Balkans,
2. providing, alongside the EU, the prospect of membership to the ex-com-
munist countries,
3. accompanying in a benign manner the modernisation process in Russia
by treating Russia as a partner, not as a real or implicit antagonist.
There is, at the same time, a continuing military role of Nato as a
producer of the public good known as interoperability and standardi-
sation, generating the technical norms and the operating procedures
which facilitate the ability of armed forces in a coalition to operate in a
manner which is both tightly co-ordinated and militarily effective. Not-
withstanding perennial complaints about Natos difÞculties in fulÞlling
this mission  and these complaints are as old as the organisation itself ,
Nato is practically the only place in which this public good is produced on
a large scale (involving mass armies), on a multinational basis (nineteen
nations) and at all levels of military activity (low end and top end inter-
operability). This asset is particularly precious to the Europeans, since
there is as yet no other organisation in which European forces beneÞt
from interoperability in such a systematic manner. Therefore, continued
US military interest in Nato is absolutely essential if mission based, tem-
porary coalitions, are to function speedily and effectively.
In itself, the death of old Nato  as an automatic defence pact and as a
war-machine  does not entail strategic decoupling between Europe and
North America. There are however two ways in which transatlantic
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strategic solidarity could be undermined: through the deliberate disregard
of the basic interests of ones partners (e.g. heedless protectionism versus
free trade, or the systematic undermining of all attempts, at establishing a
rule-based international system); or, as a result of the lack of interest in
maintaining and using the machinery which allows, if need be, the forces
of the allied countries to work together.
The Russia connection
Russia, by virtue of its location, size, population, and energy resources is
an essential partner of the European Union. In security terms, Russias
current evolution has important consequences for Europe, directly and
indirectly.
Whether or not Russia moves closer to Nato, the EU and its members
will face the indirect security consequences of Russias positioning as a
Eurasian power. This involves principally energy policy (including its
Middle Eastern ramiÞcations) and relations with China.
Russias proven oil reserves represent less than 5 percent of the worlds
total compared to Saudi Arabias share of 25 percent.6 The fact remains
that given the prospects of heightened instability in the Middle East, the
EU could do worse than focus political, legal, and Þnancial efforts on oil
prospection, and investment rights in Russia, as well as on more
traditional imports of Russian gas.
The Chinese dimension of the Wests relationship with Russia is of a
political and strategic nature. Although for the moment, this involves the
US rather than the EU, with the Western force presence in Central Asia
seen by China as a US-led challenge, the EU will have to pay close attention
to the spin off effects of its policies with Russia. The risk could now involve
a Russia that would attempt to instrumentalise the US or the EU as
partners against a demographically and economically challenging China
in the Russian Far East.
Why France and Germany?
From this overview of the new security landscape, several general impli-
cations can be drawn for the European Union in general as for the French-
German relationship speciÞcally.
! The intensity of risks and threats calls for new organisational and
budget initiatives at both nation-state and European Union levels.
! Current security challenges erode the traditional distinction between
the external and internal aspects of security and defence policy. This
must in turn lead to a much higher degree of institutional and organi-
sational congruence between the domestic and external dimension of
security and defence policy.
6  Source for all energy Þgures: BP 2002 Statistical Review.
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! Nato is not conÞgured to bear the bulk in coping with these challenges.
However, Nato should continue to play an important role as a provider
of interoperability to European defence forces. Given the changing role
of Nato, the difference of status of France and Germany vis-à-vis Nato has
become less of an obstacle than hitherto in generating European
defence policies and strategies.
! The US-European security partnership, enshrined in the Washington
treaty, subsists. However, its practical content will increasingly be
determined by extraneous factors such as the evolution of US-Chinese
relations and US initiatives in South West Asia, notably in Iraq and the
Gulf. Possible conßicts of view on such issues, along with the divergent
vision between a multilateralist EU and a largely unilateralist US, will
generate uncertainty as to the future of US-European strategic linkage.
! There exists a speciÞc and strong natural complementarity between
France and Germany. Recent experience has demonstrated that ESDP, as
other EU endeavours, cannot sustain momentum the absence of a long-
lasting Franco-German agreement on the direction of EU integration.
Alliances of opportunity or convenience of the sort prevailing between
Britain and France on European defence issues between 1998 and 2001
can be useful: but they are not a substitute for a broader-based, stable
relationship between France and Germany. These two countries are fully
involved in all aspects of EU integration, including the Euro and
Schengen, while carrying the greatest bilateral combination of political,
economic and historical weight.
The most serious sources of concern of the time  Germanys inability to
operate out of area, Frances nuclear status and its peculiar within Nato 
have either disappeared or become irrelevant. The fact of possessing or not
possessing nuclear weapons has as little bearing in Bosnia, Kosovo, or
Afghanistan as does the fact that one is or one isnt formally integrated in
the peacetime Nato command structure  what counts in this respect is
the ability to work together when required.
However, other causes of friction between Germany and France have
emerged: the differing pace of force structure reform aggravated by the
style of Frances defence decision-making in 199596, or the decline of
German defence investment. The latter needs to be dealt with if the two
countries are to play jointly a dynamic role in developing Europes ability
act in the Þeld of defence. Thus, Frances acquisition budget (RDT&E plus
equipment procurement) was $ 8,595 million in 2001 versus $ 4,675
million in Germany. Even if close to one Þfth of the French total goes to its
nuclear forces, this still leaves a ratio of 1.5 to 1 in Frances favour.7
Given the similarity of their force structure and budget choices, along
with their attitude towards the use of force, the degree of communality
between France and the United Kingdom remains greater overall than that
prevailing between France and Germany. However, that similarity is not
sufÞcient to carry forward ESDP, with Britain tending to adopt a mini-
7  Table p. 35 The Military Balance 20012002, IISS, London, 2001.
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malist version of the Petersberg tasks and sticking to a narrowly inter-
governmental vision of the EUs defence role. The threat situation clearly
calls for something more than the current, restrictive, EU defence and
security policy. It is, once again, France and Germany which can and must
now provide leadership to move the European Union to greater con-
vergence in terms of security and defence policy.
The Franco-German Experience
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The Franco-German Experience
[...] le grand projet français, poursuivi sous des formes diverses depuis
1957, repris avec de Gaulle, repris avec Mitterrand, dun couple
franco-allemand conduit par la France pour construire une défense
europénne alliée aux Etats-Unis mais indépendante deux, ce projet a
échoué (Georges-Henri Soutou, Lalliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-
stratégiques franco-allemands, 19541996, Paris: Fayard, p. 411).
One way to look at the Franco-German experience of co-operation in the
Þeld of security policy and defence is to focus on bilateral achievements 
institutional as well as military. One might, then, tell a success story of
how former hereditary enemies, overcame their century-long struggles
and achieved a form of co-operation in one of the most sensible policy
Þelds, in security and defence, creating common military units such as the
Franco-German Brigade and the Eurocorps and trying to link their
bilateral efforts to further a European security and defence policy.
Another way to evaluate this bilateral experience, the one adopted by
the historian Georges-Henri Soutou quoted above, is to look at the Euro-
pean outcome of the Franco-German political and strategic relationship
and to point to several historic opportunities to promote a European
foreign and security policy which have been missed by the two neighbours.
The period following the end of the East-West conßict and German
uniÞcation could be characterised in two ways. On the one hand as a
period during which important steps  bilateral as well as European  have
been taken to promote Franco-German co-operation in the Þeld of security
and defence, e.g. the creation of the Eurocorps, as well as on the European
level with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and, later on,
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). On the other hand as a
time of missed opportunities. This is especially true for the period ranging
from 1994 to 1997, when Frances rapprochement with Nato came to a
halt and the French army reform plans ending conscription produced
serious tensions between the two governments. And the end of the 1990s
was characterised by the fact that the major breakthrough towards ESDP
was a result of a British-French, not a Franco-German initiative.
The question is, then, what yardstick to use in order to evaluate the past
experience of Franco-German co-operation in security policy and defence.
The one chosen here is to evaluate the Franco-German experience in the
light of its contribution to the development of a European Security and
Defence Policy: its legal basis, the institution-building process inside the
EU, and to the development of civilian and military instruments and capa-
bilities at the disposal of the Europe.
Where co-operation used to end
It is by no means obvious that France and Germany should be forerunners
in European foreign policy, security, and defence co-operation, capable of
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convincing other EU member states to follow their lead. In the past, a
whole range of differences set the two states apart: their foreign policy out-
looks and ambitions, their security concepts (integration vs. independence
and sovereignty), their national understanding of civilian and military
power, their relationship with the United States and their unequal depen-
dence on the American security guarantee, their status as nuclear/non-
nuclear powers, their membership/non-membership in the UN Security
Council, their position towards Nato military integration and, at least
before German uniÞcation, very different legal and political constraints on
their foreign and security policy, especially with regard to out-of-area
missions.
Moreover, the causal relationship between Franco-German bilateralism
and European achievements is by no means obvious. In the past, it was
sometimes the other way around: failures on the road to intensiÞed co-
operation in European foreign and security policy were followed by efforts
to strengthen the bilateral framework of co-operation (e.g. the Elysée
Treaty in 1963 after the failure of General de Gaulles Fouchet-plans in
1961/62).
During the Cold War it was steps taken to improve bilateral co-oper-
ation, especially in the Þeld of security and defence, were not necessarily
intended to promote a more independent European security and defence
policy. Some motives, and not the least important ones, which in the end
lead to increased security and defence co-operation after 1982 were not,
strictly speaking, linked to this objective: French fears of a German
neutralo-paciÞsme in the aftermath of the double-track decision of 1979,
Germanys longstanding interest of facilitating a French rapprochement to
Nato and to get a clearer French commitment to the conventional defence
of German territory as well as German worries over French contingency
planning and the potential use of French short and medium range nuclear
missiles (Pluton and Hadès), all these motives did not in themselves produce
a common effort in favour of a Europeanisation of security and defence
policy.
At least some of these motives and interests are no longer valid after the
end of the East-West divide, and the traditional French goal of a politically
and strategically more independent Europe has slowly gained acceptance
in Germany. Nevertheless, this brief survey of the past suggests that several
conditions have to be met for France and Germany to play a leading role
on the road to a European Security and Defence Policy worthy of the name:
! a commonality of foreign policy priorities and objectives;
! a commonality of security interests and threat assessments;
! agreement on the instruments (civilian and military) to promote com-
mon security interests and to counter risks and threats;
! agreement on the preferred institutional framework;
! a common commitment (politically as well as in budgetary terms) to
build up crisis prevention and management capabilities, both civilian
and military;
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! Þnally the willingness of the European partners to follow the Franco-
German lead.
As to when these conditions were being met, one can distinguish three
phases:
! the period a deep divergence from 1990 to 1993 which nevertheless saw
the birth of a new military instrument, the Eurocorps, and bilateral
efforts to give the EU a role in security and defence policy;
! the period from 1994 to 1997 characterised by important convergent
developments but also by a major missed opportunity and, Þnally,
! the period from 1998 onward, characterised by a major breakthrough
on the road to ESDP, made possible by a fundamental change of the
British attitude and by a new method of European co-operation in this
Þeld.
Time of divergence: the Þrst half of the 1990s
In the immediate aftermath of the 1989/91 strategic revolution in Europe,
France and Germany developed quite different approaches to major
challenges of the post-Cold War world Europe. The two states showed
divergent sensibilities and priorities in their foreign and security policy
with regard to (potential) crisis regions. Whereas Germany preoccupied
with stability in Eastern Europe, French attention focused on develop-
ments on the Southern coast of the Mediterranean, especially the civil war
in Algeria.
The two countries also differed in their approach to the Euro-Atlantic
institutional framework. Germany was, together with the US, among the
Þrst Nato members to voice support for the Eastward enlargement of the
Alliance as well as the early Eastward enlargement of the EU. Both enlarge-
ments were expected to contribute to the stabilisation  political, strategic,
and economic  of the new, still fragile democracies of Eastern Europe
through integration in the political and security institutions of the West.
France, on the contrary, sought to restrict Nato to its old role of collective
defence, resisting at Þrst any extension to crisis management and out of
area missions while also seeking to deny the organisation a more political
role as the stabilising framework for post-communist states in Central and
Eastern Europe. As to EU integration, Paris tried to convince these states,
albeit without success, of the virtues of a European confederation as a sub-
stitute for their early accession to the EU.
The most serious Franco-German divergence, however, emerged over the
conßict in former Yugoslavia. The two countries respective interpretation
of the war and its causes could not have been further apart. For France it
was an ethnic conßict in which all parties were equally at fault, for
Germany an ethno-political conßict caused by Serbian aggression. The
different strategies and objectives that followed prevented any coherent
European approach towards what was, after all, the Þrst major challenge
to the security of post-Cold War Europe. When Germany prematurely
recognised Slovenia and Croatia this caused serious tensions both within
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the EU and at the bilateral level. Franco-German joint declarations on the
conßict of former Yugoslavia were often mere pretence, designed to save
their privileged relationship rather than to serve Europes crisis manage-
ment efforts in former Yugoslavia. At no point during this Þrst serious test
case of a European foreign and security policy was the Franco-German
couple able to inßuence the course of events.
One way of underlining the continuing value both nations assigned to
their bilateral relationship after the end of the Cold War was their decision
to set up the Eurocorps, declared operational at the end of 1995. Here, for
once, a Franco-German initiative created a European dynamic as Spain,
Belgium, and Luxembourg joined in the common endeavour. The estab-
lishment of this military instrument was not, at least in the beginning,
primarily guided by considerations of military effectiveness. Rather it was,
especially for Germany, a symbol for her continuing integration in Europe
and her enduring commitment to the Franco-German special relationship.
There was among the partners no common view either of the role and
function of this new military command or of the foreign and security
policy goals it should help to achieve. Was it to serve a collective defence
purpose or should it also be committed to crisis management and inter-
vention tasks? And if the Eurocorps were to be used for power projection
instrument at the lower end of the so-called Petersberg missions (humani-
tarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; crisis management including
peacemaking), where and in what kind of conßicts could it be used?
Neither did French and German decision makers see eye-to-eye on the
balance between territorial and alliance defence and power projection
missions. They also held different views on the geographical scope of out-
of-area missions, which the Germans, unlike France, wanted to restrict to
Europe and its surrounding: The Eurocorps is not an Afrika Korps as
former minister of defence, Volker Rühe, once put it.8 It came as no sur-
prise that the road to the SACEUR-agreement of January 1993 on the
possible use the Eurocorps in the Nato-framework turned out to be rather
bumpy.
Missed opportunities: 19941997
During the mid-1990s, a number of barriers to bilateral as well as Euro-
pean security and defence co-operation were removed or at least lowered:
! the defence white papers published in France and Germany in 1994
showed a remarkable degree of convergence in the assessment of risks
and threats;
! the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in July 1994 on out-of-area
military operations of the Bundeswehr opened the door for the partici-
pation of Germany in multinational crisis interventions; this marked
the end of German exceptionalism, at least with regard to the legal con-
straints for out-of-area missions;
8  Kein Triumphgeheul, in: Focus, No. 29, July 18, 1996, p. 22.
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! Natos late but effective engagement in former Yugoslavia not only
answered the question of the potential future role of Nato in post-Cold
War Europe; it also helped the Europeans overcome their disunity.
The most important development that brought France and Germany
closer to each other was, however, a new French approach to Nato. This
had been prepared by the intensiÞcation of Franco-German security co-
operation of the 1980s and especially by the active French military involve-
ment in the Bosnian conßict and her participation in the Nato operations
Deny Flight and Deliberate Force which led to an end of the Balkan
War.
By announcing the return of her defence minister to the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) and of her chief of staff to the Military Committee (MC),
France drew the lesson from the experience in Bosnia where French troops
were placed under the operational command of Nato; in this context,
Frances defence minister had already participated in the work of the NAC
and the chief of staff in that of the MC, albeit on an ad hoc-basis. More fun-
damentally, President Mitterrands policy during the Þrst half of the 1990s
of giving priority to the WEU as the locus for the development of a more
autonomous European security policy and defence had clearly failed. Now
Paris realised it would simply not work to build European security and
defence institutions and structures outside the Nato-framework around an
institution that other EU governments, especially the British, did not
value.
This new French ßexibility towards Nato rewarded persistent German
efforts of trying to nudge her partner towards Nato by intensiÞed bilateral
security and military relations. It also paved the way towards the formal
recognition by Nato of an European security and defence identity, pre-
paring the way for the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept
formally adopted at the Berlin Nato summit of June 1996.
Thus the gap between German and French notions of defence narrowed
as France became more  Nato-ised and Germany more Europeanised.
Yet the intended bargain between the revision of French Nato-policy and
the Europeanisation of Nato came unstuck when agreement on the reform
of the integrated command structure turned out to be elusive. Washington
refused to entrust Natos AFSOUTH command to a European admiral, a
demand formally put forward by President Chirac. The new Socialist
government in Paris reacted by blocking all further formal moves to Nato
re-integration, to considerable German disappointment  the Kohl
government had supported the French position on AFSOUTH at least half-
heartedly.
A second French move complicated the situation still further. In early
1996, Chirac decided to professionnalise the armed forces through
abandoning conscription and giving priority to operational forces for
power projection missions. The French and the German government had
reached a similar analysis of the new security risks and threats as laid
down in their respective white papers on defence of 1994  but very dif-
ferent conclusions for the reform of their military. For the Kohl govern-
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ment territorial and collective defence remained top priorities, not least
because of an a priori disposition in favour of conscription. France, on the
other side, sought above all to create more capabilities for crisis inter-
vention.
It was, however, not only the substance of the French decision that
caused irritation in Bonn; after all, improving crisis intervention capa-
bilities (the Bundeswehrs Krisenreaktionskräfte) and reducing the number
of draftees were also part of the German approach. Rather, German
frustrations and resentments over the French move resulted from Frances
apparent incomprehension that such a radical change in her force
structure would have repercussions beyond the strictly national context.9
Not only did it challenge Germanys conscription ideology; it also
inevitably would lead to the withdrawal of all French forces from German
territory and reduce the signiÞcance of such joint military units as the
Franco-German brigade where professional soldiers and conscripts served
side-by-side. Moreover, it was bound to have a negative impact on bilateral
and multilateral arms programs; these would now have to be stretched or
delayed to accommodate Frances ambitious army reform. While things
were not made easier by cuts in the German defence budget, especially in
military investment, the nagging question remained: What purpose did
the Franco-German security and defence council serve if it was not the
place to inform and consult over such a major step as the professionali-
sation of the French army?
The remedy to German irritations caused by the French army reform
was true to type: Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand at their Dijon
summit of June 1996 set up a working group to develop a joint security
and defence concept (which already the Elysée Treaty of 1963 had called
for). The The Common Franco-German Concept for Security and Defence
was formally adopted at the Nuremberg summit in December 1996. It
underlined that there should be no formal division of labour. But the
Bundeswehr with its conscription army and mobilisation capability would
serve as the backbone for territorial and collective defence allowing France
to focus on operations of crisis intervention.10
There was another remarkable point to this concept. It underlined the
common objective of a systematic search for complementarity which
would lead to a pooling of military means and freely consented mutual
dependencies in the military equipment programmes of both countries.11
9  See the interview with German defence minister Volker Rühe, related in: Karl
Feldmeyer, Unklarheiten in der deutsch-französischen Sicherheitspolitik, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, March 2, 1996, pp. 12.
10  For a discussion of the documents continuing relevance see p. 37.
11  The original text reads as follows: La recherche systématique de complémentarités
conduit à la mise en commun des moyens militaires. [...] Les deux pays saccordent pour
créer dans le domaine de la politique déquipement des dépendances réciproques libre-
ment consenties (extrait du Concept commun franco-allemand en matière de sécurité
et de défense, adopté le 9 décembre dans le cadre du 68e sommet franco-allemand à
Nuremberg, in: Les relations franco-allemandes depuis 1963. Documents rassemblés et
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(Indeed, under the budgetary restrictions of the European stability and
growth pact the top priority should be to get more defence for the same
money. This is hardly conceivable without a degree of military role
specialisation and division of labour, which, of course, creates mutual
dependencies. A Þrst tentative step into this direction might be seen in the
subsequent Franco-German understanding on satellite-based strategic in-
telligence, with France concentrating on the development of the Helios II
optical and infra-red satellite to be launched in 2004 and Germany on the
radar satellite SAR-Lupe with all-weather capabilities.
The Common Concept not only helped to allay the earlier irritations, it
also offered a road map for further bilateral co-operation on military and
armament issues, possibly leading to a common European effort at a later
stage. Regrettably, both countries were to neglect this potential, except
perhaps in some institutional aspects. The Nuremberg meeting came up
with a series of Franco-German proposals for the Intergovernmental Con-
ference (IGC) preceding the EU Amsterdam summit, many of which found
their way into the new Amsterdam Treaty: the creation of the post of a
High Representative of the EU for foreign and security policy with his own
planning and early warning unit; the introduction of a constructive
abstention in the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to
facilitate agreement in otherwise unanimous decisions, the reform of the
troika for the Unions external representation, and the integration of the
Petersberg missions into the Union treaty. Their most important proposal,
the gradual fusion of WEU into the EU framework, did not, however, gain
the necessary support, blocked as it was by a coalition of Britain and Den-
mark, the more Atlanticist members, with the former neutrals, Ireland,
Finland, Sweden, and Austria.
Thus the opportunity for a more autonomous European security and
defence policy which had presented itself between 1994 and 1997 was not
exploited. Both countries stopped half-way. They undertook to improve
their military capabilities for crisis management and intervention by
professionalising their armies  although to different degrees , and intro-
duced improvement in the treaty arrangements for CFSP. But through the
missed opportunity of Frances reintegration into a reformed Nato and the
unco-ordinated nature of their respective army reforms France and
Germany deprived themselves of the chance to become forceful promotors
of Europes security and defence policy.
Roadblocks removed: the Franco-British Initiative 1998
The years from 1998 onward witnessed the most important steps towards
ESDP since the days of the failure of the European Defence Community in
the 1950s, beginning with the informal EU summit in Pörtschach in
October 1998 and continuing decisively with the Franco-British declara-
présentés par Pierre Jadin et Adolf Kimmel, Paris: La documentation Française, 2001,
pp. 444 et s.)
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tion of Saint-Malo in December 1998. It was made possible by a remarkable
and surprising shift in British defence policy. The UK now no longer
blocked a EU role in defence but actively promoted it.
Ironically, it were the most Atlanticist and the most European of the
EU member states which gave European security and defence co-operation
a new, potentially decisive push. Yet a closer look at the conditions for the
success of the Franco-German relationship in Europe should have revealed
that the two neighbours were least likely to move matters forward in this
Þeld. They had functioned as the engine of European integration when
they had been able to agree on a common goal from very different starting
points. This was how they helped achieve monetary union: while France
and Germany held, at the beginning, the most diverging positions inside
the EU, each of them represented of a group of like-minded countries and
compromises struck between them could thus receive the support of a
large majority of EU partners. In the Þeld of European security policy and
defence, it was the UK and France  not France and Germany  who held
the positions at the opposite ends of the Atlanticist vs. European-
spectrum, Germany with its policy of trying to please both simultaneously
lying somewhere in the middle. Only a new Franco-British entente
cordiale could produce a major leap forward towards a European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP).
After a moment of hesitation, Germany quickly joined in. The Schröder
government seized the opportunity of its EU-presidency in the Þrst six
months of 1999. The Cologne summit in June prepared a Þrmer
institutional basis for EU defence by designing the new Political and
Security Committee, the Military Committee and the military staff of the
EU, to be formalised at the 2000 Nice summit. Not to get embroiled in the
institution-building activities typical for the Franco-German approach, the
British government insisted that priority should be given to military
capabilities, and the French agreed. As the Saint-Malo declaration stated:
The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to
respond to international crises. The initiative eventually resulted, in an
astonishingly swift process, in the headline goals at the EU summit of
Helsinki in December 1999 (a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000
soldiers, to be ready for deployment within 60 days, to be operational by
2003) and, one year later, in the Capabilities Commitment Conference of
November 2000 in Brussels under French presidency.
On the bilateral level, the Franco-German summit in Toulouse decided
to transform the Eurocorps into a rapid reaction corps for missions other
than those deÞned by article V of the Nato Treaty. Its headquarters should
henceforth be held available for international peacekeeping missions (as in
Kosovo, where the Eurocorps took responsibility for the command of the
KFOR Nato force in the Þrst half of 2000).
Thus the road forward has been mapped. The realisation of the plans
which originated in Saint-Malo, however, has been slow. European readi-
ness to formulate ambitious goals has not been matched by the willingness
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to implement them. The most important European armament project, the
A400M military transport plane, hailed in early 2000 as proof of the new
spirit, is a case in point. Germany, France, Britain, Spain, and Italy com-
mitted themselves to this programme, with the largest share of 73 aircraft
to be bought by Germany. Yet due to Þnancial constraints, the German
Bundestag had still not voted the required Þnancial authority by the end of
2002. Economic downturn and the limits imposed by the Euro-Stability
Pact have rendered major increases in defence spending unlikely in most
EU countries and suggest considerable delays in reaching the targets. At
least, however, they are now no longer an issue of fundamental disagree-
ment among Europes major powers.
The Franco-German relationship in perspective
After a long phase of hesitation, the EU has thus Þnally begun devising
and ßeshing-out its common security and defence policy. Yet that process
remains loaded with ambiguities still heavily bearing on its chances of
realisation. The role and place of Nato vis-à-vis the ESDP, the type of
military engagement the Europeans are willing to undertake, the geo-
graphical limits of such engagement, the Þnancial and military resources
they are prepared to commit and, last but not the least, the political and
institutional consequences for the Union of success or failure of the
project are among the most visible issues that remain unsolved.
The development of ESDP from Saint-Malo onwards has shown how
modest, even inoperative, the Franco-German relation in the Þeld of
defence has become, in striking contrast to their many achievements in
other key domains of the European construction. Before suggesting new
initiatives for the two countries in European defence it is appropriate,
therefore, to identify the causes.
The entente between Paris and London, epitomised by the Saint-Malo
declaration of December 1998, has been decisive in initiating the EUs
move towards a common defence. France and Germany have, however,
constantly reafÞrmed their determination to ensure swift progress in the
development of the European security and defence policy so that the European Union
can play its full role on the international scene.12 Frances Foreign Minister
Dominique de Villepin in his Þrst visit to his German colleague Joschka
Fischer, has pointed out: As regards European defence, we have, since the Saint-
Malo Franco-British summit, made considerable progress, but its essential not to
allow our momentum to get bogged down  From the outset, France and Germany
have been at the heart of this European ambition. I am convinced that they must,
together, go on injecting momentum and do so to a greater degree than ever
before.13 Talking about the preparation of the fourtieth anniversary of the
Elysée Treaty, Jacques Chirac has expressed his strong commitment to Þnd
12  77th Franco-German Summit, Franco-German Defence and Security Council, Freiburg
Declaration, June 12, 2001.
13  Dominique de Villepin, press conference Brussels, May 13, 2002.
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a new covenant with Germany since the Franco-German couple constitutes
Europes driving engine.14
The formal dimensions of Franco-German relations continue to look
impressive by the very range of issues they cover and by the numerous
bilateral private, public, and political structures developed to drive that
multi-faceted co-operation.
At the highest political level, bilateral summits give the opportunity to
the leaders of both countries to reafÞrm their commitment to what
De Gaulle used to call a community of destiny: Nothing in history resembles
what Germany and France have lived and gone through together ... Only they can
accomplish the gestures which will bring Europe further, in its ambitions, in its
bounds, as well in our hearts.15
The net of co-operative mechanisms spanning the two nations remains
unique. Alongside the state-to-state relationship, it encompasses a wide
range of activities involving the civil society in both countries. The
twinning of cities, towns, and villages allows hundreds of thousands of
citizens each year to experience the day-to-day life of the other and thus to
develop common understandings on a huge variety of issues. The Franco-
German Youth OfÞce (OFAJ), unique in Europe and a model to which other
countries aspire, has successfully increased the familiarity of the younger
generations with each other; it has inspired Warsaw and Berlin to create a
similar organisation. While English has sidelined French and German
respectively in the secondary schools of each country, cultural exchanges
remain numerous. France maintains some 34 institutions (Alliance française,
cultural centres, institutes on Þne arts, etc.) in Germany for that purpose.
A corresponding structure, although less comprehensive, exists in France
with the German Goethe-Institutes.
Economic relations reßect this network of co-operation. Each country is
the others most important trading partner. Business mergers span the
Rhine. The economic woes of one immediately affect the other.
The defence exception
Defence, however, has largely been an exception  despite the many links
and agreements that exist between France and Germany, apart from more
visible manifestations such as the Franco-German brigade and the Euro-
corps.
The Franco-German Council on Defence and Security (Deutsch-Französi-
scher Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat) meets under the joint chairmanship of
the French President and the German Chancellor assisted by their foreign
and defence ministers and the Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr and the Chef
dEtat-Major des Armées. The Councils deliberations are prepared by a joint
Commission on Defence and Security established in 1982, consisting of the
Deputy General Secretary of Political and Security affairs of the French
14  Dominique de Villepin, interview, Le Monde, July 30, 2002.
15  Jacques Chirac, declaration at the Bundestag, June 27, 2000.
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foreign ministry and the Chef dEtat-Major des Armées on the French side and
their equivalent on the German side (the Political Director of the German
Foreign OfÞce and the Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr). This joint com-
mission is supposed to meet formally at least twice a year ahead of the
Council on Defence and Security, also held twice a year. The joint com-
mission oversees six working groups:
! Strategy and armament, co-chaired by a representative of the foreign
and defence ministries;
! Military co-operation, co-chaired by the French Major Général des Armées
and his German counterpart; there are Þve sub-groups;16
! Armaments co-operation, co-chaired by a high representative of the
French Armaments directorate (DGA/Direction de la Coopération Industrielle)
and his German counterpart; it is divided into three sub-groups;17
! Space, co-chaired by the French head of space activities at the general
staff and his German counterpart;
! Armament policy (Rüstungspolitik), co-chaired by the French deputy
head of strategic affairs at the Foreign Affairs ministry and his German
colleague;
! Legal Aspects, co-chaired by the relevant heads of department in the
foreign ministries.
Such an elaborate organisational structure should by rights be expected
to play a major role in promoting close co-operation between the partners.
That, however, did not happen. None of the major decisions on defence
and military policy taken by either country in recent years has been
affected by these institutions. Nor did they produce a more constructive
climate in defence matters. Over the years, the meetings have become a
ritual lacking both substance and inspiration. Armaments co-operation is
an example. In contrast to what might have been expected and was
originally hoped for, the elaborate formal structure of co-operation did not
even facilitate close personal relations between the relevant bureaucracies;
in 2001, the head of the French DGA met his German counterpart only
twice.
One explanation lies in the very different make-up and mentality of
national bureaucracies. The recent reform of the German Ministry of
Defence, for instance, so reorganised responsibilities that the French
armament ofÞces responsible for speciÞc weapons families, notably the
Architectes de Systèmes de Force (ASF) within the French Délégation Générale pour
lArmement (DGA), have had problems identifying their German counter-
part. This illustrates the general problem: each country is conducting its
business without much consideration for the impact on their mutually
declared goal. This does not exclude some progress: after a slack period in
1998 and 1999, eight new technical arrangements on weapons develop-
16  Joint forces (TSK-übergreifende Fragen); Planning (PlaniÞcation); Army (Landstreitkräfte); Air
Force (Luftstreitkräfte); Navy (Seestreitkräfte).
17  Research and Technology (Lenkungsausschuss Forschung und Technologie); Pooling of
investments (Zusammenlegung von Investitionen); Sectorial analysis (Bereichsanalyse).
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ment were signed between the two countries, bringing the total to 33. But
whatever progress there has been has been distinctly modest.
From divergence to convergence?
There are, however, some hopeful signs that greater Franco-German con-
vergence on matters of defence might at last come within reach. Both
Berlin and Paris have reformed their respective military forces structure,
France since 1996, Germany since 2000. Despite obvious differences, with
France going all volunteer while Germany retains conscription for the
time being, the armed forces will have a similar size and similar missions 
which has not been the case in the past. The Bundeswehr will have no more
(and possibly less than) 282,000 personnel (193,500 professionals, 27,000
short-term professionals, and 59,500 conscripts) when France will have
245,000 personnel (without counting the Gendarmerie).
The levels of defence spending in both countries also tend to converge.
If one excludes on the French side the money spent on nuclear forces
(some 2 billion Euros or 13 billion Francs), space activities and Gendarmerie,
the difference amounts to around 11 percent in Frances favour. If one con-
siders further that Germany spends less on naval forces than France, the
potential of German Air and Ground forces are almost similar to France in
terms of deployed equipment. The Bundeswehr possesses signiÞcant capa-
bilities in combat aircraft, heavy helicopters (about 100 CH 53, heavy lift
helicopters), and armoured vehicles (about 2,500 heavy tanks) that the
French do not have in such quantities.
Defence spending in 2001
(in Billions of French Francs)
France Germany
Personnel
(without Gendarmerie in the case of France)
69,7 81,17
Maintenance of materiel 12,2 14,40
Acquisitions of equipment for Ground forces 11,9 6,07
Acquisitions of equipment for Naval forces 11,2 4,09
Acquisitions of equipment for Air forces 12,1 11,23
If current trends in German military investment are conÞrmed for the
20032008 period, Germans forces will lag behind, particularly as France
has decided to raise procurement spending by close to 10 percent, with
plans for a further 10 percent increase to be phased in during the years
2003 to 2008. Yet by 2010/2015, the armies and air forces of the two
countries will be similar in structure and key capabilities. Even if some
differences will persist, particularly when it comes to naval forces, France
and Germany will both command a military force capable of rapid inter-
vention in a crisis, in and beyond Europe. This should be a major
encouragement now to look at the opportunities involved.
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Past experience cautions. The road to a EU security and defence policy
worthy of the name remains steep, for both Paris and Berlin. In each
capital service egoisms, bureaucratic inertia and lack of political leader-
ship can continue to block it. Yet growing similarities in structure and out-
look as well as the recognition that to remain effective national defence
will have to pool resources with close allies are helping to increase the
chance for progress. The greater the convergence in military capabilities
and structures between Germany and France, the better the prospects for
Europes security and defence policy. To move ahead will mean to under-
stand and accept the profound changes a European defence identity
implies for national military establishments. Just as the introduction of
the Euro radically altered the traditional role of national Central Banks by
making them an adjunct to the European Central Bank, so ESDP within
the present budgetary constraints will call for functional specialisations,
common projects and even a division of tasks among national defence
establishments. In the interest of the common defence, what is needed is a
revolution in mentality, a willingness to compromise in vested interests
and in ingrained habits.
What did not work could now work
One of the major impediments of Franco-German security and defence co-
operation of the past can be seen in their very unequal approach in this
Þeld. There was simply no coherence and convergence to be found
between overall foreign policy goals, risk and threat assessments, military
strategy and force structures, military instruments and equipment. When
common undertakings were realised  as with the Eurocorps  the achieve-
ments were often more symbolic than real. Now the signs of convergence
are hard to overlook:
! In a speech given to the French National Assembly in 1999, Chancellor
Schröder endorsed transforming the EU into a global political player in
a multipolar international order, an idea cherished by the French.
! Since the 1994 ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, German
forces have participated actively in out-of-area missions, often providing
the largest contingents, bringing the countrys security policy in this
crucial point more in line with that of France, its European and Nato
allies. While differences remain, they are now relative instead of
absolute.
! Both countries are introducing the professionalisation of their armies
and improving their crisis management and conßict prevention capa-
bilities, albeit to different degrees, with different speeds and unequal
budgetary resources.
! Both countries are deeply committed to a multilateral approach in
security and defence policy, the Germans following their traditional
policy line of tying themselves Þrmly into a multilateral framework, the
French recognizing that multinational conßict prevention and crisis
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intervention simply do not permit an old style policy of national inde-
pendence.
! After the terrorist attacks of September 11 have reduced American
concern for crisis management in and around Europe, France and
Germany should have an easier time to convince their more reluctant
European partners of the necessity for developing a more autonomous
European capacity in the Þeld of security policy and defence.
Self-imposed limits remain. Germany needs to reconsider the recent
Bundeswehr reforms, in particular the role of conscription and the structure
and size of her defence budget, and France should re-examine her place in
a post-9/11 Nato. But once both countries accept a much higher degree of
mutual interdependence as expressed in a military division of labour and
role specialisation, France and Germany be able to give to an autonomous
European military capacity the decisive, necessary push.
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A New Start
The hiatus in Franco-German co-operation in foreign and defence policy
has been bad for each of the two countries and bad for the European
Union. It has been bad for both France and Germany because it prevented
both from optimising their assets and their inßuence within the EU. It has
been bad for the Union because it prevented Europe from exerting the
international inßuence commensurate to her economic, political, and
military weight.
In order to Þnd out how France and Germany together can change this
sorry state of affairs, it is necessary to analyse why they have failed to do so
in recent years. After all, they were once the avant-garde for European
defence efforts, fathering such signiÞcant symbols as the Franco-German
Brigade or the Eurocorps; the call for a more effective European role in
defence and foreign affairs has been heard in both capitals for many years.
The lack of closer co-ordination is even more surprising given that in
future a growing number of EU decisions with foreign policy implications
are likely to be taken by qualiÞed majority, a development Germany
openly advocates: then both will need the support of others even more to
retain their interest in the common decision, and there can be no better
basis for gaining that of a larger number of member states than a discrete
prior understanding between Paris and Berlin.
Words and deeds
Indeed, both countries have been formally committed to no less when
their leaders agreed, in 1996, to a Common Concept of Security and
Defence. It is a remarkable document, signed by the then Chancellor Kohl
and the then and now President Chirac. It states what is now quite
obvious: that both countries are exposed to the same risks for their
security (and even refers to the dangers of terrorist action); it emphasizes a
common concept for the armed forces of both countries (and declares a
willingness to discuss the role of nuclear deterrence in the context of a
European defence policy); it calls for a greater complementarity of the
military efforts both countries are making.18
SigniÞcantly, those interests and statements have not been followed
through in practice, almost as if they were not to be taken seriously. If
there is an explanation it is not the divergence of national interests but, in
both countries, a lack of ambition for shaping Europes international
environment.
While both countries may adhere to different philosophies of European
integration and may hold different views of the strategic relevance of EU
18  See above pp. 24, 25.
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enlargement, there is no serious discrepancy in their views of policies
beyond the Unions present and future borders.
This is in marked contrast to the state of affairs at the end of the Cold
and the beginning of the Balkan War. France wavered over the desirability
of German uniÞcation and saw in Bonns fairly unimpressive Balkan
initiatives the dark ambitions of an alleged Habsburg strategy. That is all
history now. Whether on relations with the US or with Russia, over the
Balkans or the Middle East, Africa or Afghanistan, there is, minor nuances
and traditions apart, a remarkable consensus on substance and process.
What is more, the foreign policy establishment in both countries has
woken up to the fact that neither country can hope to cut much of an
international Þgure on its own unless dressed in the EU cloak.
If national interests have aligned to the point of identity, if the Union is
being recognised as the essential force multiplier for the international
inßuence of each of its members, why then have both countries,
irrespective of the political colour of their governments, failed to work
together for a European foreign and defence policy worthy of the name?
The sad answer is that they did not really want to. While both have
engaged in the rhetoric of demanding a greater say for the Union in inter-
national affairs or of professing to seek the ability for autonomy in
military operations, neither has made the effort, singly or jointly, to trans-
late this into action. They have even seemed quite satisÞed, for different
reasons, with words alone.
For France, the purpose of such declarations seems to have been not so
much to inßuence international events but to articulate a recognizable
French voice, whatever its impact  a contribution more to the identity of
France than to the effective pursuit of European world interests. For
Germany, calling for a greater European say in world affairs has combined
the advantage of the politically correct buzzwords Europe and multi-
lateralism with the bonus of obscuring her own inaction. For both, the
words, not the deeds were useful, so they have preferred to stop at words.
Yet unless each country means what it says and does what it promises,
unless they share the political will to give Europe a say and a sword in the
world there will be no European foreign and defence policy.
The odd couple
The reasons why there is a clear need for a greater international role for
Europe have been put forward in the Þrst chapter of this paper. But why
France and Germany? After all, it has long been believed that in military
matters the couple of choice for France would be Anglo-French, not Franco-
German, given military traditions similar to those of Britain, a similar
readiness to dispatch forces to distant theatres, and a shared tendency to
regard the armed forces as a signiÞcant instrument of foreign policy.
Yet there are special reasons why it should be, once again, France and
Germany which need to take the initiative in bringing defence into
Europe. For one, France and Germany have a particular ability to jointly
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block any major European initiative as well as to launch one should they
so decide. This is not primarily because of the weight each of them carries
on its own in any EU decision; that is an aspect which applies to other
major EU countries as well. But once France and Germany have worked
out a common position this will represent views shared by a much larger
group of EU members; once these two agree, this is the basis for a wider
coalition of countries. Together they enjoy not only a blocking power
against other coalitions, they also are likely to be more successful than any
other formation within the EU to launch initiatives in which a majority of
other members will recognize their own interests.
For another, no other couple in the EU has been accepted so readily by
most, if not all, of the other members. For the past 50 years of European
integration, they have become used to the two heavy-weights bordering
the Rhine acting together to push things along. If the Franco-German
tandem stalls, this is for the others no reason for relief but for irritation.
Indeed, the continued stalling of the French-German engine, not least due
to the divergences relating to the future of the Common Agricultural
Policy, is perceived by most EU members as a cause for distress. Precisely
because the two countries make an odd couple they command respect
within the Union, even appreciation once they propose common action
together.
There is a third reason why France and Germany are uniquely placed to
move the Union forward in foreign and security policy as they have done
in other Þelds before: their special co-operation enjoys not only acceptance
abroad but support at home as well. The surest indicator is the awkward-
ness felt by the political class in both countries whenever that co-operation
stagnates as is the case today. In all the ups and downs of the relationship
the need to maintain it has been ingrained in the conscience of the
political classes of both countries, expressed at its most modest by feelings
of regret and uneasiness in periods of stalemate and distrust. A mutual
disposition to revive the relationship has been there throughout. No other
two countries in the Union are linked by similar emotions.
What role for institutions?
So the Þrst, indeed the most important requirement for any joint Franco-
German strategy to increase Europes relevance to international stability
and progress is this: both countries must generate the political will to help
the EU  and thus themselves  shape its international environment, and
to do this together. From both this demands a sense of responsibility, a
readiness to take the initiative, a willingness to procure the means, and
the ability to bring other partners along to a common Union position.
Once there is that will, institutions will be helpful to provide the
channels for such action. These need to be developed both at the bilateral
and the Union level.
Two facts stand out in the Franco-German special relationship: its
relative endurance and the absence of any real institutional underpinning.
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True, the record has been mixed. Sometimes, and often accompanied by a
special personal relationship between the leaders of both countries, the
degree of practical co-operation has been signiÞcant, at other times it has
been largely absent.
One possible explanation lies in the absence of any bilateral Franco-
German institution of sufÞcient relevance to day-to-day policy-making in
both capitals. Special Joint Councils, including one for defence set up in
1988, never ßourished: attendance particularly of the latter was treated by
both countries as duty, not necessity. Their existence gave neither con-
tinuity to the relationship nor did it prevent misinformation, misgivings,
and misunderstandings. Nor did the declared commitments  witness the
Common Concept for Security and Defence referred to earlier  carry any
particular weight even with those who had entered into them.
If these institutions failed, it does not follow that institutions in general
are unnecessary to support the Franco-German relationship are; it merely
suggests that the ones that were set up did not Þt a real need. The true
need for a bilateral institution, if past experience is any guide, is twofold:
to help avoid surprises over what the other government is doing, and to
offer a permanent point of contact that can survive periodic changes and
personal inclinations in the partners political leadership.
As a minimum, therefore, France and Germany should set up a low-key,
permanent Monitoring Secretariat, staffed by a small team of civil
servants from both countries and alternating in location between Paris
and Berlin. Such a modest, if permanent body could help assure a reliable
ßow of information between the two governments independent of their
respective political composition. The Secretariat, while relevant to all
sections of the administration, could be particularly useful in the military
Þeld. There are already a number of diverse contact points between the
defence establishments of both countries which would gain from perma-
nent monitoring. It would also prove highly helpful if and when France
and Germany want to undertake joint initiatives for European action in
the security Þeld.
One argument often employed against even such minor bilateral bodies
is that other European partners would resent any formalisation of Franco-
Germany intimacy. It is not borne out by experience. Not only was there
little concern when the joint councils mentioned earlier were set up. More
relevant: Most if not all EU governments prefer a France that does not set
herself apart and a Germany that knows what it wants. As has been
pointed out earlier, other EU-members have even become accustomed to a
Franco-German proposal preceding major EU-conferences; whenever the
two countries have refrained from formulating such initiatives, they have
generally been more disappointed than delighted.
The other argument against a more formal policy co-ordination between
France and Germany is that this is no longer required given the expected
creation of more efÞcient EU institutions in the area of foreign policy and
defence.
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It is no less spurious than the preceding one. However much improve-
ment the current EU Convention and the subsequent Intergovernmental
Conference may bring for the Unions institutions, these will not be self-
executing but depend on governments willing to make use of them. None
of the institutional innovations currently debated to render the Union
more capable of playing a serious role in the international arena beyond
the economic realm  whether the establishment of a foreign policy
presidency or merging of the job of the Councils High Representative
with that of the Commissioner in charge of external relations  can gener-
ate the authority for political leadership and decision unless governments
provide it. Major improvements of the EU institutions and procedures are,
no doubt, highly desirable, particularly in the foreign policy domain. But
when foreign policy and, even more, matters of military security are at
issue member states will want to retain control for the foreseeable future;
hence it is they who will have to be responsible for action. Unless the
Unions major members, above all France and Germany, either separately
or  much more effectively  together are willing to initiate, promote, sup-
port, and at times even lead, even the Þnest Union institutions will be con-
demned to inaction or political grand-standing.
Leading by example
So Franco-German co-operation makes sense for both countries, and it is
essential to give Europe the ability to shape her international environ-
ment. Provided that the governments of both countries develop the neces-
sary will to move Europe in this direction, how should they go about it?
The obvious answer is, of course, that they should strengthen the EUs
institutions and act forcefully through them.19 In most if not all instances
of foreign policy this will the best approach. In the Þeld of defence, how-
ever, it is unlikely to yield the desired result.
The reason is simply that the group of countries forming the Union is
insufÞciently united when it comes to matters of security and defence.
True, there has been progress in the important if limited Þeld of peace-
keeping. At their summit meetings at Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 all
members agreed to set up, for this purpose, a rapid reaction military force
and police units, and in the meantime the Union has established all the
committees to prepare and supervise a military operation if one were to be
decided.
Yet at the military level of capabilities, commands, and concepts not
enough progress has been made à quinze, and little, unfortunately, can be
expected. It is not only that various members have sought special status,
from Denmark to Ireland, that the Greek-Turkish deadlock prohibits the
agreement by which the EU could draw on Nato resources, operational
planning and commands, or that most countries see little margin for
19  Including, by the way, reaching a common position on matters before the UN Security
Council. That France and Britain continue to keep this outside ESDP/CFSP is increasingly
anachronistic.
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increasing their defence budgets. All these are symptoms of a more
profound attitude: namely that matters of defence and security are
regarded as less important than others which governments need to
address. As a result, all sorts of minor quarrels about status and principle
prevent consensus within the Union. In the end, these differences may
well be overcome but the end is not yet in sight. And the best way to
overcome them is by proving that co-operation works  in terms of greater
efÞciency and greater savings.
France and Germany can offer that proof; it is in their national interests
to do so. The way in which European states organise their defence is both
inefÞcient and wasteful. It is not that together the 15 EU-members spend
too little on defence: roughly half-a-billion dollars per day as compared to
Americas 1 billion plus. But because these considerable sums are spent to
support 15 separate military structures  almost 15 separate armies, air
forces, and navies, 15 separate logistic organisations  they can buy much
less operational force. If European armed forces want to move away from
this orgy of wastefulness, they will have to devise specialisation of tasks, to
use each others facilities, to pool resources. By demonstrating through
example that this can be done, France and Germany will make their own
defence effort more affordable and effective, and, at the same time,
encourage other EU members to follow suit.
How to go about this has been convincingly outlined in the Common
Franco-German Concept for Security and Defence of December 1996. It is
worth quoting at some length:
The aim of our co-operation is to maintain and improve the effectiveness of our
respective means of defence. We need to compensate possible shortfalls and, at the
same time, aim at the best cost-efÞciency ratio in the implementation of our defence
policy. The focus should be on the jointly deÞned central capabilities of the armed
forces, especially on interoperability, command and control, reconnaissance, long-
range transport, and logistics.
The systematic search for complementarities suggests the pooling of military
means. This could be conducted in the following directions:
! the tasks of both our armed forces and that of multinational European forces;
! a common approach to crisis-management and crisis-resolution;
! increased operational co-operation ...
The chief ingredients of what could be done are all here. In 1996, of
course, the contours of a European defence policy were scarcely visible;
today, Franco-German initiatives for bilateral co-operation should be in-
formed by the speciÞc relevance they could have for the European project
by addressing concrete deÞcits and making clear from the outset that
others are welcome to join this co-operation.
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Projects of promise
! The EUs envisaged Rapid Reaction Force will require strategic recon-
naissance. With Helios and SAR-Lupe, France and Germany are engaging
in building surveillance systems they need to render complementary.
One major step towards this will be the pooling of the related military
intelligence in a joint organisation.
! In addition to home-based operational commands, any serious EU
operation will require a force headquarter to be dispatched to the
theatre, equipped with secure communications. France and Germany
should set up such a mobile joint theatre command.
! A European strategic mobility command has long been proposed20 but,
due to the reticence of some EU members, still not been realised. France
and Germany should establish its air and maritime transport com-
ponent bilaterally without delay. A fully-ßedged strategic mobility com-
mand would also include the pooling of in-ßight refuelling assets.
! Training facilities are expensive duplications. It is true that the ten-
dency of major European armed forces to prefer nationally produced
weapon systems complicates interoperability and joint training also
between France and Germany. But this is not sufÞciently serious to
stand in the way of establishing joint courses at national training
establishments. At a minimum, a multilateral course segment in
national training facilities would be of high value for joint planning and
joint operations.
! Logistics organised on a purely national basis are both expensive and, in
operation, inefÞcient. For neighbouring countries likely to be engaged
together in most military operations this is a doubtful luxury. A start
could be made by making basic arsenals available to the other partner
and by pooling logistic in the Balkan theatre in which both countries
will remain involved for a long time.
! Special operation forces are likely to play an increasing role in future
military operations. France and Germany together dispose of several
thousand military personnel in these forces. The very nature of their
operations deÞes the establishment of joint units. But much would be
gained by training them jointly at regular intervals and equipping them
with compatible communications and specialised transport. If success-
ful, such programmes would encourage related efforts for the tradi-
tional forces as well. They would also be a boost for joint arms pro-
duction in these Þelds.
! Creating project budgets for joint arms programmes such as those pro-
posed above, voted by the two parliaments and supervised by a joint
commission, would reduce many of the frustrations currently accom-
20  Les Etats membres  se félicitent  des décisions [préparant] létablissement dun
commandement européen du transport aérien (Conclusions de la Présidence, annexe 1 à
lannexe IV, Rapport sur létat des travaux établi par la présidence pour le Conseil euro-
péen de Helsinki concernant le renforcement de la politique européenne commune en
matière de sécurité et de défense, Brussels, December 1999.)
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panying common procurement efforts. It would strengthen the
authority of the joint organisations created for this purpose, increase
the incentive for European arms producers to work together, and
engage national parliaments. Such project budgets could also serve as a
model for possible joint EU funding at a later stage.
Time for a new start
There will be other examples of joint projects in which France and
Germany can engage. What the list presented here demonstrates is the
wide range of opportunities. None of them requires, for the military estab-
lishment of either country, a drastic departure from current practices, yet
all contain elements that could encourage the major changes which will
be needed in the longer run if both countries want to maintain affordable
and useable armed forces for themselves and for Europe. Moreover, as the
reference to the 1996 Common Concept underlines, they represent a
frame of mind which both countries have long professed.
They should be closer to implementing what they proclaimed then for
two reasons: the growing compatibility between the structures of their
respective armed forces, and the mutation of Nato. France is now com-
pleting the transition to a force structure optimizing large numbers of
ready forces for military operations not limited to the European theatre.
Germany, a late starter, still lags behind but increasingly realises the
importance of completing and adjusting the Bundeswehr reform begun two
years ago.
Nor is the fact that France has remained outside, Germany inside Natos
integrated military structure the obstacle to closer defence co-operation
between the two countries it once was. Nato, as the Þrst chapter of this
paper has shown, is undergoing dramatic change. From having been the
sole organiser of the common defence of all allies, it is becoming, at least
for the United States, its pre-eminent member, one coalition among
others, useful as the provider of forces for speciÞc coalitions of which the
EU or parts of it can be one. Taking part in the integrated military
structure, therefore, is not, if it ever was, to accept subordination but to sit
on the management team of a body which is becoming more central to its
European members than to the United States. Moreover, President Chirac,
now newly elected for a Þve-year term, has long shown a pragmatic rather
than ideological inclination towards Nato.
One of the foremost challenges for the Franco-German defence relation-
ship is a sober assessment of these changes and their implications. There is
a good prospect that both countries will arrive at conclusions which are
not fundamentally different. It is this which should provide a Þrm basis
for a new start in defence co-operation  in the interest of Europe and in
that of both countries as they are approaching the fourtieth anniversary of
the Elysée Treaty.
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Abbreviations
AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe
ASF Architectes de Systèmes de Force
BW Biological Weapons
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF Combined Joint Task Forces
DGA Délégation Générale pour lArmement
EC European Community
EDC European Defence Community
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
KFOR Kosovo Force
MC Military Committee
NAC North Atlantic Council
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
OFAJ OfÞce Franco-Allemand pour la Jeunesse (Franco-German Youth OfÞce)
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RDT&E Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
TSK Teilstreitkraft
UN United Nations
WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
